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Symmetry, Forced Asymmetry, Direct Apprehension and Elective Modernism 
 
Harry Collins 
Cardiff University, UK 
 
Crazily, Norris seems to think sociology is at war with philosophy; it is not.  I respond to his 
hostile comments on the sociology of scientific knowledge, which was inspired by 
Wittgenstein, by explaining the need for symmetry in the explanation of scientific knowledge, 
methodological relativism, elective modernism and a number of other issues.   
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A good proportion of the population of Northern Ireland are convinced that in the mass the 
bread and the wine only represent the body and blood of Christ. A good proportion of those 
who live in the South believe that there is transubstantiation: that is the bread and the wine 
become the body and the blood. The sociology of knowledge takes it that the difference in 
view is not to do with the actual bread, wine, body and blood but the histories of the two 
                                                 
1 I start froŵ the proďleŵ of sǇŵŵetrǇ rather thaŶ froŵ Norris͛s ;ϮϬϭϰͿ ĐoŵŵeŶts ďeĐause ŵostlǇ I haǀe Ŷo 
idea what he is talking about. He seems to have constructed a world in which hatred or fear of philosophy 
ŵotiǀates the arguŵeŶts of ͚soĐiologists͛ suĐh as Bloor aŶd ŵǇself. But Daǀid Bloor is a philosopher, aŶd I speŶd 
a lot of ŵǇ tiŵe trǇiŶg to ďe a philosopher suĐh that the first tǁo Đhapters of ŵǇ ϭϵϴϱ ͚ŵajor stateŵeŶt͛, 
Changing Order (Collins 1985), are philosophy (they may be bad philosophy), I continually claim that the source 
of most of my inspiration is philosophy, I publish quite a bit in philosophy journals, I have co-authored a number 
of articles and a book with philosophers and, more recently, Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences and 
Philosophia Scientiae have each published special issues on my work while the Journal of the Polanyi Society has 
published a special section. Also I am proud to be an invited contributor to Huďert DreǇfus͛s Festschrift though 
Dreyfus and I disagree about a number of things. As I explain below, I do have enormous scorn for what I call 
͚presuŵptuous philosophiĐal ďottoŵ feeders͛ aŶd iŶdiffereŶĐe to the regular ďottoŵ feeders, soŵe of ǁhose 
antipathy to the sociological analysis of science is so much more marked than that of the physical scientists with 
whom I spend about half my academic life. It may be bottom feeders who Norris has in mind when he uses the 
terŵ ͚philosopher͛ iŶ desĐriďiŶg a world of vicious professional rivalry that is otherwise unrecognizable to me. 
Or it may simply be that if you disagree with Norris on a matter of philosophy he interprets this as you being 
against philosophy as a whole, or maybe Norris thinks the proper eǆteŶsioŶ of ͚philosophǇ͛ is restricted to 
justification of certain beliefs. The problem is confounded by the fact that people like Bloor, myself, and my co-
author Martin Kusch, see no tension between doing sociology and doing philosophy whereas Norris sees them 
as mutually exclusive. 
groups and the upbringing of their members and tries to show how these ways of life work; 
that is a symmetrical view. To use old-fashioned language that is still useful for this purpose, 
eaĐh side͛s ǀieǁs are giǀeŶ aŶ ͚eǆterŶal͛ ;EǆtͿ eǆplaŶatioŶ. An asymmetrical view, in contrast, 
would preserve the Ext analǇsis for, saǇ, the North ďut proǀide aŶ ͚IŶterŶal͛ ;IŶtͿ aĐĐouŶt for 
the South. In the Int account the view of the Southern Irish is given a two part explanation: 
(a) Reality: During the mass the bread and wine really do change into the body and blood. (b) 
Direct apprehensibility: Transubstantiation is, somehow, directly, or near directly, 
apprehensible to Southerners but not to Northerners.2  
Direct, or near direct apprehensibility is essential because if the truth of the matter is only 
eǀideŶt ǀia others͛ interpretations then it is the interpretation that is the crucial thing on both 
sides of the explanation and we are back with symmetry – it is upbringing that provides the 
interpretation and it would be interpretation on both sides.3 
Table 1: Symmetry right and wrong 
 
In Table 1, crosses mean wrong while ticks mean right and the possible types of explanation 
in the case of symmetry and asymmetry are shown. In the case of symmetry, both sides are 
given an Ext explanation and both sides can be wrong or the left-hand side wrong and the 
right-hand side right or vice-versa. In the case of symmetry, just because a side is given an Ext 
explanation it does not mean it is wrong. Thus, even though the sociology of knowledge would 
tǇpiĐallǇ eǆplaiŶ the SoutherŶers͛ ďelief iŶ traŶsuďstaŶtiatioŶ ďǇ refereŶĐe to their 
socialization, and even though that view was in fact the result of socialization, the view could 
still be correct – the bread and the wine might change. The symmetrical view simply has 
nothing to say on the matter. In contrast, in the case of asymmetry there is always one Int 
explanation and one Ext and the Int side must always be right. Therefore, it follows that the 
Ext side must always be wrong since there can only be one right. That the Ext side is forced to 
be wrong is indicated by the arrows. The third logiĐal possiďilitǇ, ͚IŶt-IŶt͛ is iŵpossiďle iŶ 
practice since there can only be one right and Int-Int would imply direct, or near direct, 
apprehension of two mutually exclusive possibilities. 
 
                                                 
2 The SoutherŶ Irish ǁould, therefore, ďe said to ďe ͚ratioŶal͛ or soŵe suĐh. ;TheǇ Đould ďe said to ďe respoŶdiŶg 
to the ͚T‘ASPŶess͛ of traŶsuďstaŶtiatioŶ – Collins 1981a.) 
3 The need for direct apprehensibility is nicely brought out ďǇ Norris͛s gleeful repetitioŶ of ‘iĐhard DaǁkiŶs 
argument about the absence of relativism at 30,000 feet. This is taken to show that asymmetry is forced in the 
case of aeronautical engineering since an airplane passenger would directly apprehend that at 30,000 feet, it is 
ďetter to ďe traǀelliŶg iŶ a BoeiŶg thaŶ a Đargo Đultist͛s ŵodel airplaŶe. That appreheŶsioŶ is ǁell-observed but, 
unfortunately for the asymmetrist, it says nothing about the apprehensibility of theories of aeronautical 
engineering since the passengers know nothing about them except what they have been told. In a similar way, I 
can directly apprehend (or close to directly apprehend) that if I were to swallow-dive from the table on which I 
am typing this onto the tiled floor of my kitchen it would be bad for me but this does not lead directly to the 
truth of Newtonian physics nor the science of medicine. 
symmetry  asymmetry  impossible 
Ext Ext  Ext Int  Int Int 
x x  x √    
x √  Int Ext    
√ x  √ x    
The symmetrical view, to repeat, says nothing about what is actually going on in the world 
outside of the experience of the actors. For example, in this case it makes no claim about 
whether or not transubstantiation actually takes place in the mass.4 All that is needed to 
sustain the Ext-Eǆt aŶalǇsis is that there is Ŷo part ͚ď͛ – no direct, or near direct [hereafter 
͚direĐt͛] appreheŶsiďilitǇ. Either of ͚Eǆt͛ eǆplaŶatioŶs Đould oǀerlie the truth of the ŵatter. 
Thus, though I do not believe in transubstantiation this is largely to do with my upbringing 
and experience as a scientifically-minded, atheistic, jew (I am here giving an Ext account of 
my view of bread and wine), but I have never taken part in a Catholic Mass and, if I did, I am 
not sure how I would recognize whether transubstantiation had taken place in the absence 
of a lot of interpretation. The Ext-Int analysis, on the other hand, requires ďoth ͚a͛ aŶd ͚ď͛ for 
the Int side and implies that the Ext account masks the truth of the matter. In asymmetry the 
Ext view must be wrong because the Int view is right by direct apprehension and, to repeat, 
there can only be one right.  
 
In the case of most of the topics to which the sociology of knowledge can be applied, the 
symmetrical approach seems safer as direct apprehensibility (even near direct 
apprehensibility), is a tricky thing. Furthermore, asymmetry carries serious methodological 
perils. First, the analyst has to know which side is right and it can be that this decision 
emerges, unnoticed, from the analyst’s upbringing rather than from direct apprehension and 
that the part ͚ď͛ – direct apprehension imputed to the actors – is only assumed rather than 
demonstrated. Second, it seems dangerous to be able to backslide from the difficult task of 
explaining world views by choosing, every now and again, to allow them to be their own 
explanation. I prefer symmetry for this kind of reason and I call the positioŶ ͚ŵethodologiĐal 
relatiǀisŵ͛.5 In a phrase that might have set a record for being quoted out of context, I say 
that to adhere to methodological relativism in a suitably rigorous way the analyst should act 
as though the natural world does not affect what comes to be believed about it.6  
 
But, for the sake of argument, let there be topics to which the sociology of knowledge could 
be applied where an asymmetrical approach forces itself upon the analyst – these will be 
called cases of FA (Forced Asymmetry). There are a number of well-know philosophical 
problems indicating that it might be hard to find ǁhat ǁe ŵight Đall ͚sǁeet FA͛ ďut ǁe doŶ͛t 
want to get stuck quite so early so, to move things along, let us suppose that it is possible to 
directly apprehend that grass is green. Note ǁe are igŶoriŶg thiŶgs like ͚grue͛ aŶd ͚ďleeŶ͛ aŶd 
the faĐt that a lot of grass is Ŷot greeŶ aŶd that ǁe doŶ͛t reallǇ kŶoǁ ǁhat grass is or ǁhat 
green is. In spite of these problems, let us take it that where one group says that grass is green 
and another that grass is red, an asymmetric analysis is forced. So we have found a way of 
imagining FA, at least for the sake of argument. But we have also had to acknowledge that FA 
is not philosophically straightforward.  
 
                                                 
4 Thus there is no question of conflating ontology and epistemology. It is true that in my writings prior to 1981, 
ŵost ŶotaďlǇ iŶ ŵǇ ϭϵϳϱ paper, ͚The SeǀeŶ Seǆes͛ (Collins 1975), I claimed to be doing the equivalent of what 
Norris describes as replacing ontology with epistemology but after 1981 I became agnostic about the 
philosophical argument, concluding that I had no idea how these things worked in the long term, and replacing 
it with a methodological imperative about how to study science as it presents itself to us. The current paper is a 
philosophical reflection on how a sociologist must think and analyse. 
5 Collins 1981a. 
6 Collins 1981b, especially p. 3, which should be read in the context of p. 54 and surrounding. 
The problem is that Norris appears to think that science as a whole exhibits FA. This is 
obviously not the case in at least two respects. First, science tends to take a long time to 
apprehend anything with any certainty. Thus, I have been studying attempts to detect 
gravitational waves with terrestrial detectors – a big expensive bit of science – for more than 
40 years and as I have shown at length in many papers and three books there is no FA. The 
difference between those who think or have thought that gravitational waves have been 
detected on Earth and those who do not is not a matter of direct apprehension on the one 
hand and failure to apprehend on the other. All parties argue in the same way using the same 
techniques and methods to try to prove their point. Second, and more profoundly, there is 
almost no direct apprehension to anything in science, most obviously modern science. To 
quote my rather long 2004 book, Graǀity’s Shadoǁ, on the sociological history of gravitational 
wave detection: 
 
 Reflect on what you know for sure about the things that are the business of 
science. The answer is almost nothing. We are all the same in this respect; we all know 
almost nothing. How can I be so confident about writing this when you, reader, might 
be anyone, perhaps even a gravitational wave scientist? It is because even if you are 
among the best and most brilliant scientists in the world, you know for sure almost 
nothing more than the most scientifically ignorant of us when by ͚knowing for sure͛ we 
mean knowing to the standards of scientific proof: direct and repeated witnessing. Areas 
of expertise are like crevasses: deep and narrow. Even the best and most brilliant 
scientists have directly witnessed real proof in only that tiny part of the natural world in 
which they are specialists—and it is not so clear what ͚directly witnessed͛ means even 
for them, since ͚witnessiŶg͛, and this is becoming more and more noticeable nowadays, 
is merely the conclusion of a very long chain of inferences. 
 As for the rest of the natural world, scientists know about things in the same 
way as we know about things: from hearsay. And even if you are one of the scientists I 
describe in these pages—one of the gravitational wave specialists—you know most of 
what you know about even gravitational waves from hearsay; that sounds odd, but think 
about it! Nearly all the science you know you learned from the printed page, the lecture 
theatre, or other sĐieŶtists͛ talk aŶd aĐtioŶs. EǀeŶ the results Ǉou kŶoǁ ďǇ so-called 
direct witnessing are tiny corks bobbing on a huge sea of trust—trust in the results of 
earlier experiments, trust in the colleagues who work with you, trust in the meters and 
the materials which make up your apparatus, and trust in the computers that analyze 
the experiment.7  
 
In other ǁords, for all of us, it͛s ŶearlǇ eŶtirelǇ a ŵatter of historǇ aŶd upďriŶgiŶg. In most 
science this is obvious because the facts are still being reconciled never mind being directly 
apprehended; but it is pretty obvious even where there is good consensus among the natural 
scientists. 
 
There is a whiff of paradox here because I am saying that certain things, such as the fact that 
ǁe kŶoǁ ŵost of the sĐieŶĐe ǁe kŶoǁ froŵ hearsaǇ, ͚are oďǀious͛ – i.e. directly 
apprehensible – whereas I have just been arguing how rare and philosophically recalcitrant 
immediately apprehensible things are. I was all set to apologize for the compartmentalization 
involved until it occurred to me that something more profound might be worth pursuing. 
                                                 
7 Collins 2004, 4-5. 
When we look for matters directly apprehensible we may have been searching in the wrong 
plaĐe: perhaps ǁe shouldŶ͛t ďe lookiŶg for ǁhether grass is greeŶ or eǀeŶ for a ͚ seŶsorǇ atoŵ͛ 
suĐh as ͚greeŶ here Ŷoǁ͛. Perhaps a ďetter ĐaŶdidate for direĐt appreheŶsioŶ is ͚this is hoǁ it 
is to exist iŶ ŵǇ soĐietǇ͛. SuĐh a Đlaiŵ, after all, is a report of oŶe͛s daǇ-to-day experience with 
no added synthesis. Nothing is that easy, unfortunately, and even this apprehension does 
demand some conscious reflection in order to avoid the overlay of mythical descriptions of 
experience that we live with, such as, for example, that the facts of science are known directly: 
one has to reflect to notice it is not so. Hence the need for the above passage from Graǀity’s 
Shadow which may, initially, have struck its readers as counter-commonsensical and which I 
know some philosophers find it hard to get their heads round – though most natural scientists 
of my acquaintance can.8 But a bit of reflection seems a small price to pay for something so 
apprehensible. What I am saying is that the paradigm for direct apprehension should not be 
sensory experience but social experience. Perhaps this aĐĐouŶts for ͚the uŶreasoŶaďle 
effeĐtiǀeŶess of partiĐipatorǇ ŵethods iŶ the soĐial sĐieŶĐes͛.9 
 
Bottom feeding 
Proceeding to take methodology rather than philosophical principle as the crucial matter, let 
us consider the possibility that it might not be unreasonable to do asymmetrical studies of 
science if you wait long enough. A philosophiĐal ͚ďottoŵ-feeder͛ Đould ǁait uŶtil the faĐts of 
science had drifted all the way down through the multiple digestive systems of the big 
scientific fishes in the ocean of verification and settled in the sediment of uniform or near-
uniform consensus. That consensus might, perhaps, be used as a proxy for a direct 
apprehension to which neither analyst nor actors have access. This is because anyone who 
does not accept that degree of consensus is close to being crazy albeit in a socially deviant 
way rather than a distorted vision way. For example, 30 or 40 years from now it could be that 
gravitational wave astronomy is no more remarkable than radio-astronomy and anyone who 
no longer believed in the detectability of gravitational waves could be reasonably treated in 
the same way as one would nowadays treat someone who did not believe radio-telescopes 
were really seeing stars (note that we, who firmly believe they are detecting stars, have 
mostly never looked at the heavens through a radio-telescope and, even if they did, would 
not know how to tell whether they were seeing stars or not). I doŶ͛t thiŶk oŶe ǁould learŶ 
much from such an asymmetrical treatment but I would not know how to argue against 
someone who wanted to provide one except to say that it was not a very productive thing to 
do.10  
                                                 
8 It is not surprising that the scientists can handle the idea since they are continually involved in assessing 
ǁhether or Ŷot to take others͛ eŵpiriĐal aŶd theoretiĐal Đlaiŵs seriouslǇ aŶd it is, perhaps, Đlearer to theŵ thaŶ 
to philosophers that direct apprehension is not going to help. 
9 For years I have told the following story: My friend Gary Sanders, the then project director of the Laser 
Interferometer Gravitational-Wave Observatory (LIGO) was once ragging me about the weakness of my 
sociological methods which amounted, as he put it, to ͚askiŶg a feǁ people ǁhat theǇ thought aŶd reĐordiŶg it 
as a fiŶdiŶg if tǁo or three of theŵ agree͛. At the tiŵe ǁe ǁere haǀiŶg luŶĐh iŶ the LIGO LiǀiŶgstoŶ iŶstallatioŶ 
about 40 minutes drive from Baton Rouge, Louisiana. I replied that my methods were much more robust than 
his. Having never used public transport in Louisiana, I was ready to bet that I could not get on a bus in Baton 
Rouge and buy two tickets, one for me and one to reserve the seat next to me. I pointed out that our joint 
certainty about that was greater than his certainty would be when the first gravitational wave was discovered. 
It has taken all this time for it to occur to me that there might be something more going on here than a quip.  
10 It could be – I am really not sure – that the idea of bottom-feediŶg relates to Norris͛s disĐussioŶ of stratifiĐatioŶ 
iŶ the relatioŶship of oŶtologǇ to episteŵologǇ; ďottoŵ feeders ĐoŶĐeŶtrate oŶ oŶe of Norris͛s strata. 
 The bigger trouble with philosophical bottom-feeders is that they have a tendency to drift 
upward through the sea and grab morsels that have not yet been fully processed and take it 
to be their business to eject them from the body of science. It is a contemporaneous and 
premature Whig history of science – premature ejection as we might say. For example there 
is a ǁhole ŵoď of ͚philosophers͛ ǁho graď the ďits spat out ǁheŶ the ďig sĐieŶtifiĐ fishes take 
the occasional ill-advised bite out of parapsychology and the like. Presumptuous philosophical 
bottom feeding is shameful stuff.  
 
OŶe thiŶg I learŶed froŵ the ͚ScieŶce Wars͛ 
 MǇ first ďig eŶgageŵeŶt iŶ ǁhat ďeĐaŵe kŶoǁŶ as the ͚SĐieŶĐe Wars͛ ǁas a ďlaziŶg roǁ ǁith 
Luis Wolpert at the British Association for the Advancement of Science; it was in 1994. One 
thing Wolpert said stuck in my mind, however. He said that in his field –embryology – one had 
to be reading new research papers every week to keep up with the field whereas in our field 
– science studies – nothing ever changed. And here we are again going over ground that was 
argued to death, as I thought, in the early 1980s; thus there was something in what Wolpert 
said. 
 
And yet I do not think the charge sticks to sociology of scientific knowledge (SSK) and what 
followed anything like as firmly as it does to science-wars type activity itself. Of course, SSK 
was itself inspired and informed by philosophy, notably Wittgenstein and Kuhn, but I think I 
can describe the difference between it and the typical philosophy of science problem when 
the 1960s was turning into the 1970s and I was first becoming acquainted with it. Duhem, 
QuiŶe, HaŶsoŶ, Popper, Lakatos, aŶd others ǁere stǇŵied ďǇ ǁhat ǁe ŵight Đall the ͚Đhild͛s 
picture model of sĐieŶĐe͛ ;CPMͿ. When children draw their houses they sometimes put a strip 
of blue along the top – the sky – and a strip of brown or green along the bottom – the ground. 
In the CPM the equivalent of the top strip is theory and the equivalent of the bottom strip is 
findings; the job of philosophy of science was taken to be to show how they articulate. The 
Đleǀer philosophers argued that the tǁo strips ǁere Ŷot reallǇ iŶdepeŶdeŶt ;͚oďserǀatioŶs 
were theory-ladeŶ͛ etĐ.) but progress was slow, consisting of incremental shifts from the 
CPM.11 Sociology of scientific knowledge and the symmetrical approach sidestepped the CPM 
by simply studying the ways that people were persuaded to take this or that as knowledge, 
with science as a specially interesting and specially easily researchable case.  
 
What then happened was extraordinarily rich. Through closely examining science with an 
attitude that Đaused oŶe to ask, ͚Hoǁ do theǇ argue for this rather thaŶ that?͛ rather thaŶ, 
͚What ǁould a ratioŶal persoŶ thiŶk?͛ the ǁhole world of science opened up. To brainstorm, 
we (the collective we – the science studies community), discovered the crucial role of tacit 
knowledge in carrying out scientific experiments and, consequently, the problem of the 
͚eǆperiŵeŶter͛s regress͛ aŶd that replicability is as much consequence as cause of agreement 
over findings. We found the extent to which experimental findings were interpretively flexible 
aŶd hoǁ this alloǁed ͚ŶoŶ-sĐieŶtifiĐ͛ iŶterests to iŶflueŶĐe ǁhat ĐouŶts as a sĐieŶtifiĐ result. 
We found that fringe sciences and core-sciences were treated very differently by journalists 
in terms of the extent to which they accounted themselves expert (relationship between 
                                                 
11 I have to admit I have not read as much very recent philosophy of science as I should, but it sounds from 
Norris͛s desĐriptioŶ as though it is folloǁiŶg the path that SSK has opeŶed up, aŶd that ŵust ďe a good thiŶg.  
constitutive and contingent forums). We found that military funding for research followed 
the logiĐ of PasĐal͛s ǁager aŶd ǁas far ŵore opeŶ thaŶ Điǀil fuŶdiŶg. We explored in detail 
the different logics and imperatives of small science and big organized science. We uncovered 
the ͚literarǇ teĐhŶologǇ͛, that gaǀe rise to the sĐieŶtific paper and more recently we have 
come to understand that this technology is equally effective whether applied by the Nobel 
laureate, the iŶterŶet ĐraŶk or the ͚sĐieŶtist͛ purĐhased to ĐoŶstruĐt a Đase for the toďaĐĐo 
industry. We now see why knowing findings and theories is not enough to understand science; 
the scientific community has to be known as well. Confronted with the social basis of 
knowledge we discovered how some kinds of human action can be mimicked by computers 
whereas artificial intelligence still awaits the breakthrough that will allow computers to 
become social if the other kind of action is to be copied. We discovered the process by which 
͚ships are put iŶto ďottles͛ or sĐieŶtifiĐ ideas are ͚ďlaĐk ďoǆed͛ so that disputes ďeĐoŵe ǀerǇ 
hard to re-open and we found that some of this has to do simply with the way findings are 
expressed in publications – the stripping of modalities. We disĐoǀered the ͚Đore-set͛ of deeplǇ 
involved experimenters and theoreticians and how it relates to the much larger penumbra of 
those who discuss and evaluate. We disĐoǀered that ͚distaŶĐe leŶds eŶĐhaŶtŵeŶt͛: the 
penumbra is far more certain of its knowledge than those in the core-set and that is why as 
knowledge moves from the core to the outside rings debating turns into campaigning and 
this, in turn, explains a huge amount both about how science works in its interaction with 
policy and the public and how our own fields carry out their business – not least science wars. 
We disĐoǀered the idea of ͚eǀideŶtial sigŶifiĐaŶĐe͛ – that the same findings could be 
interpreted in ways more or less portentous with very different risks and consequences. We 
discovered the difference between evidential individualism and collectivism where in the first 
kind of science each person is considered responsible for their own findings and errors 
whereas in the second kind of science potential findings are broadcast and assessed in public 
by the whole scientific community. We found that technologies were as differently 
interpretable as scientific results and that development trajectories were affected by 
meaning rather than the logic of materials. We uncovered the relationship between testing a 
device and using it and we found the difference between an experiment and a demonstration. 
We disĐoǀered the iŵportaŶĐe of ͚iŶteraĐtioŶal eǆpertise͛ aŶd hoǁ eǆpertises Đould ďe 
classified and distinguished and we found how to subdivide tacit knowledge into kinds. We 
found out the many ways in which interdisciplinarity can aŶd ĐaŶ͛t work and so on. This list 
covers only things that have the potential to circulate outside of specialist and inward-looking 
scholarly boundaries, spreading to other communities and appreciated by physical scientists, 
by knowledge engineers, by computer designers and testers, by music pioneers and by policy-




Three waves of science studies and elective modernism  
Returning to methodological perils, in the case of asymmetry, the analyst knows (or believes 
they know), which side is right and which side is wrong at the outset of the analysis. 
Furthermore, the analyst has to believe that the rightness of the right side is directly 
apprehensible (part b). This is quite different from symmetrical analysis where the analyst 
does not know who is right and/or is careful not to make any such assumption or align the 
supposed rightŶess of oŶe side or the other ǁith the aŶalǇst͛s oǁŶ ǀieǁ. In the case of 
symmetry the analyst finds an Ext explanation for all views whether right or wrong; in the 
case of asymmetry the analyst has to find an explanation for why those on the Ext side do not 
apprehend the obvious truth of the matter. Explaining turns to blaming! To explain properly 
can be hard work as the many case studies of scientific dispute reveal – one has to get right 
inside the world view of those who do not apprehend the world in the same way as the 
analyst.12 It is, therefore, tempting for the analyst to take a short cut and guess at the 
explanation. Norris͛s reǀieǁ of Bloor is useful iŶ that it illustrates the proĐess rather 
beautifully. Norris is convinced that his view of how science should be analysed is the correct 
one and the directly apprehensible one (at worst, a bit of reading will cure the affliction of 
the benighted Bloor, Collins et al. and convert them from the Ext side to the Int side). Norris 
then explains the initial reasons the afflicted find themselves on the Ext side:  
 
Any honest or clear-headed answers ... might well have to do with such prickly matters as 
cultural capital, professional self-interest, disciplinary rivalry, the job-market, physics-envy, 
philosophy-phobia, research-grant scarcity, and above all the chronic insecurity of social 
scientists vis-à-vis the natural and formal sciences.13 
 
This is the kind of thing that can result from the felt force of the arrows in Figure 1. It is hard 
to imagine a lazier way of analysing anything. Beloǁ I fiŶd ŵǇself agaiŶ iŶ Norris͛s haŶds: 
 
However he [Collins] has now become anxious about Phase Two, not least as a consequence 
of talking to medical experts on the topic of the AIDS epidemic in sub-Saharan Africa. ... Collins 
finds it inconceivable that the resultant problem might require some re-thinking of those 
Phase-Two premises and a readiness to allow the possibility that Phase-One thinkers like 
Merton got it right [and there is more such stuff].14 
 
It is time to draw this to an end. There is no great change of mind going on here. Our book, 
The Golem became a cause celebre in the science wars because the Cornell physicist, David 
Mermin, took it to be attacking the truth of relativity.15 It was doing no such thing as the logic 
of symmetry makes obvious and as Mermin was happy to admit after he and his colleagues had 
talked it over with us.  This can be seen in another book, the one that resulted from that 
discussion and which, I believe, ended the science wars (holdouts such as Alan Sokal and Chris 
Norris aside).  That book is an edited debate between a science side (Bricmont, Sokal, Saulson, 
Mermin, Wienberg, Wilson, Barsky, Labinger) and a social science side (Pinch, Lynch, Gregory, 
Miller, Shapin, Dear, Collins) and is called The One Culture.16 And wave 3 of science studies 
was anticipated as early as the first edition of The Golem. Published in 1993, and written at 
least a couple of years earlier, on page 140 we find:  
 
Let us admire [scientists] as craftspersons: the foremost experts in the ways of the natural 
world.17  
 
                                                 
12 See, e.g., Collins and Cox 1976. 
13 Norris 2014, 9-10. 
14 Norris 2014, 27. 
15 Collins and Pinch 1993.  
16 Labinger and Collins 2001. 
17 One can also find sentiments not too far from this around p. 54 of Collins 1981b. 
I cannot speak for the whole science studies community but I know that me and my colleagues 
from the Edinburgh School and the Bath School have always been great lovers of science and 
that is why we wanted to understand it better. Nothing has changed in that regard and there 
is going to be still more friction with Norris͛s ͚eǆplaŶatioŶs͛ of ǁhǇ ǁe ďelieǀe ǁhat ǁe do 
when he sees the next, Cardiff, iŶstalŵeŶt of the ͚third ǁaǀe͛ – ͚eleĐtiǀe ŵoderŶisŵ͛. 
 
Under elective modernism there is most ĐertaiŶlǇ ͚a readiŶess to alloǁ the possiďilitǇ that 
Phase-One thinkers like MertoŶ got it right͛ aŶd it is Ŷot ͚doǁŶright uŶthiŶkaďle͛,18 as Norris, 
never shy about imputing an internal state to someone else, says it must be to people like us. 
What Collins actually believes Merton got right was the excellence of the value-system of 
science. What Merton was right about was that the values of science are good ones – in a 
morally absolute sense – without any need to justify them by reference to the efficaciousness 
of what emerges from them.  
 
And that is the clear difference between people like Norris and people like myself – elective 
modernists. Norris only loves science and scientists that produce correct results; this is a very 
small proportion of science, identifiable in the long term at best. Elective modernists love all 
scientists including the ones that are wrong and working on material too early in its gestation 
for us to know how it will turn out. So long as they are seeking truth with integrity – so long 
as they are ĐleaǀiŶg to MertoŶ͛s aŶd other sĐieŶtifiĐ ǀalues – elective modernists love the 
econometric forecasters who get the economy wrong year-after-year; they love the rejected 
parapsychologists; they love the long-term weather forecasters; they love the mavericks who 
think they have shown experimentally that relativity is wrong; they love those who think that 
anti-retroviral drugs are poisonous and who led Thabo Mbeki not to distribute them in South 
Africa. And you have to be ready to love wrong scientists if you want to love science because 
most scientists are wrong. But to love these wrong scientists along with the right ones is not 
to give them parity of esteem for what they find. Eventually, just like any other citizen, the 
sociologist of scientific knowledge will prefer the science that he or she comes to use. 
Crucially, to love anyone with scientific integrity is not to treat all such people symmetrically 
when it comes to making policies that turn on science and technology. TodaǇ͛s policy-making 
is an immediate business, not a bottom-feeding business, and there is no choice but to make 
judgements about how the long term will turn out long before it arrives. Wave three argues 
that the best such judgments (which may not turn out to be the right judgments) are made 
by the wisest people – and that, of course, begs a load of questions and spawns a series of 
fascinating research projects. The elective modernist does not love Thabo Mbeki because 
Mbeki did not base his judgements on the views of what were, at the time, believed to be the 
wisest people, and the elective modernists would not advise that parapsychology or 
alternative medicine or anti-relativity views inform political judgements. The analysis of how 
policy should draw upon science is one thing and it should be asymmetrical; the analysis of 
how one thing rather than another comes to be believed to be scientific truth is another thing 
and to do it properly requires symmetry; as for scientists, irrespective of their results, some 
are bad people to be scorned but most have been professionally brought up to be good 
                                                 
18
 Norris 2014, 35. 
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